Letter from the President

Comparative Politics and Sociology: Love Lost and Regained

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In his essay on “State and Civil Society,” Antonio Gramsci wrote:

“The rise of sociology is related to the decline of the concept of political science and the art of politics which took place in the nineteenth century… Everything that is of real importance in sociology is nothing other than political science” (1971: 243; Torpey 2006: 609).

I am less concerned than Gramsci was with who has displaced whom than I am with what has developed into a wide gap between our own subfield and sociology – even that portion of sociology that concerns itself with politics. A datum may help to establish this gap: While 35 of the 49 authors in the recently published Handbook of Political Sociology have their main appointment in Departments of Sociology or Rural Sociology, an additional 7 work in other venues, while only 7 are political scientists (2005: xv-xxi).1

The point is not, however, who publishes where, but the fact that many sociologists are doing work that political scientists should be reading and vice versa. And many of them are not. While a new injection of energy entered our field from economics twenty years ago or so, our subfield’s traditional marriage with sociology has gone untended. In this Letter, I will call for a re-marriage of two historically-linked disciplines that time, human events, and internal preoccupations have to some extent torn asunder. But first, allow me to offer one comparativist’s view of what happened to bring about the partial divorce of these two sister disciplines.

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Love Lost

Looking back at the early 1960s, we can already see the roots of future estrangement. Although sociology has many mansions, the part of that discipline which instinctively appealed to our predecessors was theoretical macro-sociology, and particularly the peculiarly bloodless variety emerging from the school of Talcott Parsons. Parsons, some will remember, saw
(Continued from page 1)

conflict as dysfunctional and strove to identify the functional requisites of all societies. He also operated at such a high level of abstraction that much of empirical sociology lay beyond his reach. Not a lot of sociologists were ready to embrace the Parsonian pattern variables, but they had a curious appeal to political scientists who emerged from the cauldron of World War Two trying to bring order out of chaos.

“Development studies” was one area in which there was a temporary convergence among economists, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and area specialists. In the years surrounding the independence movements of former colonized countries, members of all these disciplines thought they were contributing to a dual project: a) location of all societies at different stages of development with regard to economic growth, population change, education, and political structures, and b) predication of the strategies to lead latecomers to successful development.2

There were of course sociological influences closer to the empirical base of political science. Take Seymour Martin Lipset: his first book (with Martin Trow and James Coleman) on the International Typographical Union (1956) was rich with political implications. And he produced the best study of the politics of the American and Canadian prairies (1990), using a method of paired comparison that would become more common in comparative politics than in sociology.

The late sixties exploded the influence of both sociological functionalism and mainstream sociological empiricism, and laid the groundwork for a new synthesis – the neo-Marxian project. Where students of my generation had read Marx and Weber, the generation of the 1970s studied Marcuse, Poulantzas, and, yes, Mao, and busied themselves deciding whether the state was wholly, or only relatively, dependent on society. Those debates were passionate and incisive but they pulled away from the professional directions in which comparative politics was moving.

The neo-Marxian project would ultimately fail, but it brought a generation of radical sociologists and political scientists into the study of still another abstraction: state monopoly capitalism. That led some to abandon political science altogether and others to...
the particularly uncomparative persuasion known as World Systems Theory (Wallerstein 1974; Arrighi 1985). In this movement, in contrast to the variation-finding comparisons that had become the stock-in-trade of comparative politics, the variations that scholars studied were enclosed within an “encompassing” model of global capitalism (Tilly 1984: ch. 8).

From 1968 to State Theory

One intellectual trend of the 1960s and 1970s did offer a new synthesis of comparative politics and sociology: state theory, and particularly that branch of it associated with the work of Barrington Moore, Jr. and two of his students, Charles Tilly and Theda Skocpol. Moore’s central construct was the formation of durable inter-class coalitions that produced the democratic, the authoritarian, and the collectivist states’ routes to the modern world (1966). This was just the thing to unite comparativists and sociologists who had been socialized during the 1960s but were unwilling to divert their energies into either neo-Marxism or world systems theory. An important application was to the rapidly growing subfield of comparative political economy (Gourevitch 1986); another was to the comparative study of revolutions.

Just as structuralist as her great teacher, but more determined to elevate the role of the state, Theda Skocpol insisted on the weight of different regimes within the most radical of political transitions – social revolutions (1979). While she eventually admitted the importance of ideology, leadership, and even religion (1994), Skocpol’s statist put Moore’s social coalitions on the back burner. But she did give a generation of young sociologists and political scientists a common target. While a whole new industry of sociologists and historians grew up “correcting” Skocpol’s views of revolution (Goldstone 1991; Goodwin 2001), in political science she became known mainly for her stalwart statism (1985).

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Charles Tilly, who began his career rooting around in French archives (1964), also broadened his reach to the formation of national states throughout Europe. Tilly’s early work on the Vendée was as class-based as Moore’s but his ultimate contribution to state theory was to wrest it from the structuralist chrysalis in which Moore had embedded it. With a group of distinguished historians, Tilly undertook the work of the Committee on Comparative Politics (Tilly 1975) by focusing on the historical processes that produced modern western national states (1990). The resulting The Formation of National States remains most comparativists’ major acquaintance with Tilly’s contribution, while, for sociologists, he is more closely associated with the empirical study of contentious politics (1979; 1995).

From State Theory to Historical Institutionalism

In part because statism was often reduced to the duality between strong and weak states it was bound to collapse as neoliberalism arose and appeared to weaken the hold of the state over society (see, for example, Evans et al. 1985). By the early 1990s a landmark collection by Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (1992) helped to open a new chapter and a better specified version of statism studies in what came to be called “historical institutionalism” (HI).5

There are of course, both narrow and broad specifications of institutions. The broadest version (e.g., identifying different types and trajectories of historical polities in the tradition of Montesquieu, Bryce, Hartz, and Moore), is still extant in such long-term studies of regimes as James Mahoney’s historical-institutionalist study of Central America (2001) and in Tilly’s continuing work on democratization (2004a) and regimes (2006). But statism has largely given way to greater specificity and to a focus on the policy consequences of different institutional arrangements, as in the vast literature on neo-corporatism and in more recent work on labor markets (Swenson 2002; Thelen 2004). As Ira Katznelson and Barry Weingast write, the HI persuasion “has developed as a somewhat narrower, more focused, offspring of the earlier body of historical social science. Its temporal sweep is shorter. The range of regimes it considers is more limited. It is interested as much in durable patterns as in immense change” (2005: 13).

To my eye, beyond the assertion that institutions matter and a growing focus on how they change (Thelen 2004), the current version of HI lacks a coherent theoretical project. Of course, that is what makes it attractive to scholars in a wide variety of fields – from traditional comparative politics to area studies to American political development. But if Katznelson and Weingast are right, and HI contains scholars as far apart ontologically and methodologically as Immanuel Wallerstein and the present author, then HI risks becoming coterminous with the historical study of politics tout court. That is no crime in
itself but it has prevented HI from building useful bridges to the two more theoretically driven versions of institutionalism that developed at the same time: sociological and rational choice institutionalism.

Three Institutionalisms

After the 1970s, not all sociologists were abandoning historical-comparative studies. In addition to historical sociologists like Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, Mann, and Tilly, a wide-ranging group of sociological institutionalists (SI) appeared (see, for example, Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Brinton and Neé 1998; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1987). Both HI and SI scholars care deeply about how institutional practices originate and change (Hall and Taylor 1998: 25–27), but members of the two schools seldom cite one another, mainly work in different institutions, attend different conferences, and – except for a few excellent examples (see, for example, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Streek and Thelen 2005), seldom collaborate.

The distance between historical and sociological institutionalism is in some ways puzzling, but the gap is impossible to miss. For example, only one of the authors in the definitive HI handbook, Structuring Politics – Frank Longstreth in the UK – is listed as teaching in a department other than political science (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992: xi-xiii). Sociological institutionalists are not much more ecumenical: As two card-carrying sociologists point out, they have become “predominantly (though not necessarily) associated with the constitutive role of culturally legitimate models of organization and action,” and appear to “marginalize the processes of conflict and innovation that are central to politics” (Clemens and Cook 1999:441).

“Many political scientists were increasingly attracted by imports from microeconomic thinking that left little room for the classical social structure categories of political sociology: they turned to rational choice (RCI).[...]”

At the same time, many political scientists were increasingly attracted by imports from microeconomic thinking that left little room for the classical social structural categories of political sociology: they turned to rational choice (RCI). Too much (and a great deal of it of uneven quality) has been written about the duel between rational choice and historical institutionalism in our discipline for me to be able to add very much to what others have written (Katznelson and Weingast, eds., 2005; Soltan, Uslaner, and Haulef, eds., 1998). Happily, that standoff is giving way to more collaborative efforts. Katznelson and Weingast begin their introduction to Preferences and Situations in this way:

“Despite their differences, historical and rational choice institutionalism (RCI) have a good deal more in common as a result of their convergence on institutions than is ordinarily realized. The dissimilar strengths of these ‘schools’ can advance each other’s agendas, some aspects of which have been converging” (2005:2).

To Katznelson’s and Weingast’s generous ecumenism, I would only add one amendment, as HI and RCI relate to parallel developments in sociology. An advantage that RC institutionalism shares with sociological institutionalism is the explicit identification and specification of the micro-mechanisms that drive institutional processes (Nee 2005). That of course leaves macrosociologists and historically oriented political scientists unsatisfied (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001), but it does focus attention on actors and their incentives for change. In contrast, HI institutionalists are more likely to specify change as macrosocial processes (Pierson 2003) or as institution-wide mechanisms (Thelen 2003:225-3). That of course leaves RC institutionalists indifferent, since the mechanisms they posit are overwhelmingly dispositional.

Sociological institutionalists are better than both political science schools at integrating social variables into their analyses in a manner consistent with institutionalism (Nee 2005: 54). As Hall and Taylor observe,

the new institutionalists in sociology [...] argue that many of the institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizations were not adopted simply because they were most efficient for the tasks at hand,
in line with some transcendent rationality. They argued that many of these forms and procedures should be seen as culturally specific practices (1998:24).

**Bringing Society Back In**

This is not to denigrate either historical or rational choice institutionalism. While the former represents a refreshing retreat from the holistic statist of the 1970s and 1980s, the latter proposes a general model of societal interaction based on micro-mechanisms. But in both routes, one of the traditional linkages between comparative politics and sociology – the impact of stratification systems on politics – has become less important. In the meantime, students of voting were quietly shifting their focus from social class to personality and to individuals’ economic incentives as the primary determinants of voting choice.

“This shift away from social structure in electoral structure occurred so incrementally that its momentous importance for our relationship to sociology was largely missed.”

The decline of class analysis is in part the result of changes in the practice of survey research. In the early days of electoral studies, comparative survey researchers focused largely on the links between objective social formations and politics (Alford 1963; Lipset 1960). What remains of class analysis in comparative politics has largely come from scholars in the field of comparative political economy (Golden and Pontusson; 1992; Swenson 1989 and 2002; Wallerstein 1989) and labor market sociology (Western 1997). Only recently have scholars begun to return to the origins of voting studies in the social embedding of electoral choice. In work that grew out of social network studies, they are finding, for example, that interaction with family and friends has significant effects on voting choice (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007).

**Love Regained**

Bringing society back into both electoral and institutional studies seems to me a major goal around which comparativists can come together with sociologists. And that is my major conclusion. Our subfield has been so consumed with, first, the struggle between, and then the reconciliation of HI and RC institutionalism that we have largely ignored the contributions that sociologists are making to both. Now that we are moving beyond our internal preoccupations, a bridge to sociological institutionalism and to political sociology, broadly conceived, can help bring about a remarriage of comparative politics and sociology (Clemens and Cook 1999).

But these are not the only areas in which the foundations exist for rebuilding the ties between the two disciplines. As a certified critic of the “paradigm warfare” that so often mars both fields (Tarrow 2004), I don’t want to slide into telling other people what I think they should be doing. So I will only list four areas that I have observed in my own work and in that of colleagues. In two of them – social movements/contentious politics and comparative welfare states – convergence is well advanced, while in two others – social and political networks and globalization – parallel progress calls out for greater collaboration.

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**Social Movements and Contentious Politics:** After a period in which it verged on the study of abnormal social psychology, after the 1960s the sociological study of social movements grew closer to the language of political scientists. The forerunners, of
course, were Tilly (1979) and Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1977), both of whom worked with essentially political models of movements. Then John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977), Doug McAdam (1982), and Edwin Amenta (2005) published work that converged with what comparativists were doing on Europe (della Porta 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1989). Under the leadership of Dutch sociologist Bert Klandermans, a collaborative tradition of social movement research developed among Europeans and Americans that nurtured a series of collaborations between sociologists and political scientists (Klandermans 1989; Jenkins and Klandermans 1995).

On a related track, sociological students of nationalism were interacting with comparativists. Although I can think of only two explicit collaborations (Hechter and Levi 1985, and Brubaker and Laitin 1998), sociologists like Rogers Brubaker were widely read by political science students of nationalism (1992). And what sociologist working on nationalism has not been profoundly influenced by Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (1992)? But in a parallel area of contentious politics – the study of civil wars and organized political violence – sociologists seem unwilling to stray very far beyond their well-worn field of social movement studies.® To my knowledge, among sociologists, only Tilly and Mann (Tilly 2004b; Mann 2005) have taken on the massive and important subject of political violence.

Comparative Welfare States: A second area in which economic sociology and comparative politics have converged has been in the study of the welfare state, its permutations across space, and its changes over time. Many of today’s HI institutionalists began by working on the state and various forms of economic inequality (Pierson 1994; Pontusson 2005; Steinmo 1993; Swenson 1989) while sociologists like Janoski and Hicks (1993), then Hicks on his own (1999), and then Kenworthy (2003) applied cross-national quantitative analysis to the rise, variations, and presumptive decline of state activism. Here, an available body of data and accepted practices of utilizing it in the OECD statistical yearbooks facilitated interaction among scholars; while the global challenge of neoliberalism gave them a common historical/policy target for collaboration and differentiation.

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Social and Policy Networks: In contrast to contentious politics and welfare states, an area in which sociologists have made more theoretical progress than political scientists is in the development of social network theory. In cognate areas like interest groups, political scientists were way ahead, which would lead one to predict a convergence that has not, to my knowledge, occurred. The difference appears to be largely one of concreteness vs. abstraction and between narrative/institutional approaches and mathematical ones. Social network theory has grown into a relentlessly “techy” enterprise with high entry costs (Wellman and Berkowitz 1997), while political scientists using the concept of networks have largely used institutional narratives, concentrating on two empirical areas in particular, policy networks (Katzenstein 1977; Marsh et al. 1997; Rhodes 1998) and NGO networks, especially transnational ones (Keck and Sikkink 1998). A rare crossover was the inspiring work of sociologist Roger Gould, who carried out both original historical work (1995) and theorized the uses of network tools in comparative historical research (2003).

The most sustained effort to study policy networks by sociologists comes from the University of Chicago Sociology Department (Laumann and Pappi 1976), and from David Knoke and his collaborators looking comparatively at labor networks (Knoke et al. 1994), but the mathematical bent of most sociological work on networks has left its achievements outside the reach and the patience of most comparativists.® With one exception: an interesting adjunct to network analysis, political scientists and sociologists have been collaborating in the study of social trust (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005).

Globalization and Internationalization: No review of the relations between sociology and comparative politics would be complete without touching on the issue of globalization. A parallel ontological development in the two fields has propelled them in the same direction: constructivism in political science and norms-based institutionalism in sociology (compare Katzenstein 1996 with Meyer and Rowan 1977, and Boli and Thomas 1999 in Sociology). Globalization is bringing together political scientists and sociologists in common venues. For example, the final section of the
Handbook of Political Sociology (2005) begins with a theoretical introduction by a sociologist, Philip McMichael (2005), continues with an article on economic and social policy by two comparatists, Evelyne Huber and John Stevens (2005), moves from there to the politics of immigration and national integration by two sociologists, Thomas Janoski and Fengjuan Wang (2005), and concludes with an article on transnational social movements by a sociologist, Peter Evans (2005). There can be no greater sign of the convergence of the two disciplines than seeing them zeroing in on a major issue of global importance.

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There are, of course, differences of definition and appreciation between the two groups of specialists. While comparatists (no doubt influenced by their proximity to International Relations) frequently focus on the process of internationalization as well, sociologists seem content to deal with its sister concept alone. In addition, while sociologists of the institutionalist persuasion have done much to document the diffusion of norms across borders (Boli and Thomas 1999), they have been less concerned with the actors who transmit these norms and with how they broker the domestication of universal norms in various parts of the world (Tarrow 2005).

As for the biggest question raised by globalization and internationalization (e.g., is it erasing the line between domestic and transnational politics?), neither discipline has proposed satisfactory answers. But this only means that — like most marriages that are on the rocks — the love affair between comparative politics and sociology needs more work.

Notes

1 A multi-national effort by political theorist Robert Goodin and sociologist Charles Tilly is more ecumenical, counting 15 sociologists in their Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis (2006). Of course, many sociologists who study politics would consider themselves historical, comparative or social movement sociologists, and not political sociologists.

2 I cannot tell a lie: this way of framing the issue I owe to my collaborator, teacher, and critic, Charles Tilly, who often knows better than I do what I mean to say in my first drafts.

3 Some important actors in the political development field were closely associated with American foreign policy. For example, before writing The Passing of Traditional Society (1958), Daniel Lerner had edited Propaganda in War and Crisis: Materials for American Policy (1951).

4 But see the spirited re-specification of the “decline” of statism by Jonah Levy and his collaborators (2006), which sees a shift in the focus of state activities rather than a decline.

5 Indeed, if we want to find recent statements of the statist persuasion, we would need to turn to historical sociology (For a good example, see Ertman 1997).

6 An effort by two sociologists and a political scientist to construct a unified field of “contentious politics” that would range from social movements to political violence has so far been cordially ignored by most sociologists (McAdam et al. 2001). What can you do?

7 Sociologists practicing social network theory and political scientists studying policy and NGO networks may have more to say to one another than either of them realize. For example, in the area of transnational advocacy, a more systematic measurement of network structures could narrow the concept of network beyond its loose use by NGO advocates and help to understand why some networks endure while others dissolve after the campaigns that give rise to them are over. One collaboration between a political scientist and a sociologist has done just that (Levi and Murphy 2006).

8 Peter Evans’ article is an exception. After detailing with enthusiasm the potential of counter-hegemonic movements, he points out that their success depends on a politics of institution building and alliance formation (2005:669).

Note:

Complete citations for this issue are online at http://www.nd.edu/~apsacp/backissues.html.
Academic Freedom and the War on Terror

Introduction

In its conduct of the War on Terror since 2001, the Federal Government has implemented numerous public policies that have profoundly affected – some would say negatively influenced – the intellectual environment and core missions of higher education and scientific research. With the imposition of stricter restrictions on the matriculation of foreign students and their participation in government-funded research projects, new curbs on the movements of foreign scholars wishing to travel to academic conferences in the US, and closer scrutiny of academic resource materials imported from abroad by American based scholars, these new policies have transparently and significantly impacted American political science, but perhaps no more so than in the subfield of comparative politics.

Against this backdrop, “Academic Freedom and the War on Terror” is the most controversial symposium we have organized during the past four years. Indeed, partly because of the nature of its subject, it is a symposium that almost didn’t run. Specifically, two factors that do not normally apply constrained our ability to recruit contributors to the symposium. First, the universe of comparativists who could speak expertly and eloquently about the theme of this symposium was far smaller than that from which we usually recruit symposium contributors. Although the War on Terror has affected all comparativists to some degree, its repercussions nevertheless have been most urgent and profound for the circumscribed group of Middle East experts and other comparative politics scholars whose research directly intersects hot button US foreign policy and security agendas. Second, within the aforementioned group, there were several potentially excellent contributors who for their own reasons turned down our request to contribute. As a consequence of these constraints, we were not confident that we would be able to organize a full symposium until perilously close to the deadline for putting this newsletter together. In light of these obstacles, we are even more grateful than usual to the scholars who did contribute.

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transparently and significantly impacted American political science, but perhaps no more so than in the subfield of comparative politics.”

We asked our contributors to address how the War on Terror has affected their freedom to investigate, speak, and write. Although, as you will see below, our query yielded diverse responses, we were nevertheless surprised by the common passion and even outrage it provoked. Although we suspected that work had become more difficult for many comparativists since 2001, we were unprepared to learn of the extent to which, at least in some cases, personal lives had been disturbed. As the essays by Jytte Klausen, Melani Cammett, and Larry Diamond underscore, taking a side, or merely appearing to take a side, in these conflicts can exact and has exacted high personal as well as professional costs. This seems to be true whether one sides with the Bush Administration and its international allies or with the Administration’s critics at home or abroad. Moreover, we were equally unprepared and chagrined to discover that where serious problems have arisen the situation has not automatically improved with time. As the essay by Jytte Klausen makes clear, conflicts over academic free speech on college and university campuses continue unabated more than five years after the tragedy of September 11th.

Most disturbing, however, is the conclusion reached by Ellen Lust-Okar, Lisa Anderson, Steven Heydemann, and Mark Tessler that, in the shadow cast by September 11th and its political aftershocks, “Middle East specialists tend to exercise a high degree of self censorship.” Moreover, in the face of intimidation by campus-based and other ideologically motivated “watchdogs,” Middle East experts now routinely “abstain from exposing violations of academic freedom.” To the extent that these statements universally apply, it is difficult not to conclude, as Lust-Okar et al. do, that “the challenges facing Middle East specialists are, ultimately, threats to us all.” If so, comparativists who hitherto have been untouched by the negative events and trends cited in these essays would do well – indeed are obligated – to support whenever and wherever necessary the academic freedom of their besieged colleagues.
How the War on Terror Affects Me as a Political Scientist

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In thinking of the effects of the War on Terror on my work as a political scientist, I want to distinguish between my different roles as a political scientist and the different dimensions of the War on Terror. In this essay I will consider its effects on my work as a researcher, as an organizer of research programs and conferences, as a teacher, as a policy advocate, and as an “applied” political scientist seeking to advance democratic development in other countries. Since I have joined as a plaintiff in the ACLU lawsuit (which will be heard in Federal District Court in Cincinnati on January 31) against the federal government’s warrantless surveillance of international phone and email communications, let me begin with that program and reflect on the ways it affects me as a political scientist.

Blanket, Warrantless Surveillance

My work as a political scientist in each of the above roles depends in part on my ability to communicate freely with people throughout the world who are working for democratic change or who have information and analysis that bears on this struggle. Occasionally I am in contact with people in Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere around the world by means of long-distance telephone calls, and much more often by email. US-based scholars and advocates like myself receive email messages from opposition activists, human rights workers, journalists, civil society leaders, and academics from parts of the world where freedom is insecure and where warrantless interception of communications with the United States appears to be taking place – the Middle East, Southeast and South Asia, Central Asia, and possibly Africa as well. These people report on human rights abuses and on political developments. They offer information, share strategies, and seek advice. What would they think if I were to tell them that their communications are being intercepted, stored and analyzed by super-powerful computers, and possibly some day used against them when they want to apply for a visa to come to the US, or seek some other source of support from the US? Trust in the United States government and its intentions are very low in the aforementioned parts of the world, even among people who share our stated commitments to freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. Second, some of these people are critical of US policies as well as the policies and practices of their own government – and these criticisms are part of what political scientists like me need to hear and learn as we engage them. Even if they are committed democrats, even if they are totally opposed to terrorist means and philosophies, will they feel free to express their concerns about US policies and actions when their statements may be intercepted, stored and analyzed by super-powerful computers, and possibly some day used against them when they want to apply for a visa to come to the US, or seek some other source of support from the US? Third, many of these people live in repressive countries that are strategic allies (or at least geopolitical friends) of the United States, countries such as Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Jordan, and Egypt. Or they live in repressive countries that were once close to the United States and could be again some day, such as Uzbekistan. These people could have cause to fear that information we gather on them could be provided to their own governments some day, for example “swapped” in order to gain from their governments intelligence we deem relevant to the war on terror.

Why would the United States betray the very advocates of freedom we are trying to help around the world? I hope we would not. But the record of the United States over the past fifty years does not inspire adequate confidence among people who are risking their lives and reputations to bring about democratic change, especially people who are doing so with political platforms and programs that are at
times critical of the United States. When the United States – even under the strongest rhetorical advocate of democracy promotion in the history of the American presidency, George W. Bush – says we support freedom everywhere and then betrays it in places like Egypt and Azerbaijan, democratic forces get bitter and nervous. Trust and hope begin to evaporate again.

Some of the people who are aided by the United States today in their fight for freedom fear they could be betrayed tomorrow. They know that geopolitics is a fickle business. They hope that the United States will be a beacon of democracy – that we will always stand up for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. But they will not bank their lives and all of their political dreams on this hope.

Indiscriminate, warrantless surveillance casts a chilling pall over the communication we need and want with such people. That this pall is in many of its manifestations diffuse, subtle, and hard to measure does not make it less damaging. It can inhibit informants from making phone calls and sending emails to the US that report developments and deliver opinions and analyses critical of their own governments, or of the United States government, or even perhaps of powerful American or international business interests. It inhibits my ability to gather information for research and advocacy, and to have unimpeded exchanges with scholars around the world. It will be harmful to social science research on these parts of the world, and on processes of regime change. It will weaken our ties with people in these countries, ties we need to cultivate and expand, not constrict, if we want to foster democratic change and win the war on terror. In damaging our ability to investigate and explain as social scientists, it also damages our long-term national interest. If we do not understand the politics and social dynamics of the frontline countries in the War on Terror, how can we mitigate the causes of terrorism?

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There is also the problem of being able to communicate with students of mine who are doing their own research, or conducting research for me, in countries that are being monitored through warrantless surveillance, and on subjects that are politically sensitive, such as the prospects for democratic regime change or the opposition movement in a particular country. If these students or research collaborators need to coordinate with me from the field on their ongoing research, to report findings, consider options, ask questions, and evaluate next steps, how can they do so freely knowing that their communications are liable to be intercepted by the National Security Agency? At what point do we place at risk individuals who have agreed to be interviewed under strict conditions of confidentiality when we discuss the content of these interviews or even the fact of these interviews through electronic communications that could be intercepted by this program? What happens to the capacity for academic research in these circumstances? In the last year, this has become a very real concern for me, as a student of mine has conducted research – in part for his own senior honors thesis, in part to support my research – on the politics of an important, pro-American authoritarian state in the Arab world. I had to instruct this student, and really lean on him, not to communicate any of the details of his research with me by email from the country in question, and in particular not to convey anything that could in any way identify the confidential sources of his interviews. In the end, I really could not communicate with him in the field about the essence of what he was doing, because if you can’t use email and you can’t use the phone (or Skype), what’s left? I wouldn’t trust postal mail, either, and in any case it’s too slow.

Engaging Troubled Parts of the World

Another problem that has plagued my role as an organizer of research projects and international visits in comparative politics is the immensely frustrating task of trying to get scholars over here for conferences and academic visits. What we are doing to harass, offend, and sometimes humiliate people at our airports and borders who happen to have the "wrong" name, accent, or skin color is deeply distressing at a normative level. But it is also a serious obstacle to academic research and cooperation, because there are people from the "wrong" parts of the world who just don’t want to run the gauntlet of this type of reception any more. Then add to this the vastly increased difficulty in getting visas. One of the institutes with which I am associated has been trying for months to bring a prominent democratic activist from a frontline...
state in the War on Terror to our center to spend a time in residence as a fellow. He would have much to contribute to our studies – and much to gain in understanding about democratic development. However, the process of getting a visa to the United States has been dragging on for months. My guess is that this is because he is targeted by the authoritarian regime of his country for his outspokenness and activism. His country is an important ally of the United States in the War on Terror, and has detained relatives in order to get after him (he is now in a third country). My suspicion is that his government has said to the United States something like this: “You want our cooperation in detaining people you say are terrorists. Well, we say this guy is a terrorist. Don’t let him into your country unless you intend to turn him over to us.” So he sits in limbo, waiting.

Symposium

Another problem that has plagued my role as an organizer of research projects and international visits in comparative politics is the immensely frustrating task of trying to get scholars over here for conferences and academic visits.”

A more debilitating experience for my academic work involved the months of frustration of trying to get about eight Iranian scholars and civic leaders and thinkers to come to a conference we held at Stanford University a couple of years ago. It is just absurd what Iranians have to go through to get a visa to come to the United States. We have no embassy in Tehran, so Iranians must travel to another embassy, for example in Dubai, to apply. Then they must go home and come back for an interview. If they are lucky, after spending hundreds of dollars and a number of weeks on the process, they may then only have to wait another six months to get the visa. But for some, it can be a lot longer. And of course, many are still waiting. Two of the people we wanted to bring simply didn’t get approved in time, even though we started some eight months in advance. Even if – as a respected American institution of higher learning with a research agenda that would benefit our national interest in understanding a region – a university like ours is able to get the cooperation of the local American embassy in expediting the visa process, there are still many opaque steps in the process, including reviews by the Department of Homeland Security that can go on interminably.

These circumstances may help to explain why the number of foreign students enrolled in US universities declined for three consecutive academic years following September 11th. Apparently, that trend of decline is now slowly reversing, but it would be worth someone’s time to research what is happening to the recruitment of social science graduate students from countries in regions that are implicated in the War on Terror. I suspect that is not rebounding. It needs to.

I would like to conclude by noting that the impact on our sub-discipline of September 11th and of the War on Terror is not entirely negative. One positive development is the dramatic growth in the number of US students studying Arabic, Farsi, and other languages of affected regions. I would bet that we are going to look back in ten years and see a boom in research on politics and social movements in the Arab world, the broader Islamic world, Central Asia, and other affected areas because of the heightened salience of these regions and the greater availability of research funds and jobs. Although it is more difficult to work in many of these countries now, it is also more compelling, and it is still the case that many of the best students love a challenge.

“One positive development [...] is the number of undergraduate students who are studying Arabic and other critical languages [...]”

I have been simply astonished (and enormously pleased) in the last few years at Stanford to encounter the number of undergraduate students who are studying Arabic and other critical languages, and who are thinking about acquiring the training to do academic and/or policy research on these parts of the world. Some of them will form part of the next generation of comparative politics specialists on the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa, and will gradually fill the crippling gaps in departmental curricula and expertise. Others will go into business, NGO work, and the arts. A good number will take their language and area training and enter the diplomatic corps. Maybe then, twenty or thirty years down the road, the next time we decide to bet the farm on our relationship with one Arab country, we’ll have more than a handful people in our embassy who can speak the language.
Comparative Politics of the Middle East and Academic Freedom

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Middle East specialists study a highly politicized area, in both the region and the US public sphere. Many proponents of what are often called “pro-Israeli” and “pro-Arab” – or, sometimes, pro-Muslim – positions see themselves facing an existential threat, battling for their rights against a ruthless and unjust enemy. Armed with a sense of righteousness, activists and advocates are sometimes willing to go to enormous lengths to counter and even suppress any views and information that they believe might strengthen their opponents. This tendency, we argue, has historically shackled the academic freedom of Middle East specialists and hindered the development of comparative politics.

In this context, the tragic events of 9/11 have had decidedly mixed consequences for specialists of the region. On one hand, 9/11 brought an infusion of funding for Middle East studies and a heightened demand for Middle East specialists within academia, the private sector, and government. Yet, it also exacerbated longstanding tensions within the field. Public outrage against the Arab Muslim terrorists who flew the planes on 9/11 transferred easily to a fear of Arabs and Muslims more generally. This, combined with the Bush administration’s promotion of polarization – “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists,” said the President – empowered those who support current US and Israeli policies toward the region and emboldened attacks on those who disagree, including academic area specialists. This put those attacked on the defensive, stalling many while pushing others to respond in kind. In short, 9/11 has escalated the conflict that has long affected the field of Middle East politics. Unless these problems are recognized and countered, even the current infusion of resources and talent are not likely to improve our study of the region.

The Problems Facing Middle East Specialists

Criticism of Middle East specialists emerged immediately after 9/11, and it escalated as supporters of the Bush administration’s War on Terror sought to silence academics that were skeptical about the project, or opposed to US policies toward the Middle East more generally. In the fall of 2001, Martin Kramer published a scathing attack on Middle East studies, and particularly the professional Middle East Studies Association, in which he claimed that the 2,600 members of the association had failed to appreciate fully the threats emanating from the region. The next year the Middle East Forum launched Campus Watch to “review and critique Middle East studies in North America, with an alleged aim to improving them.” This apparently laudable goal concealed a far more ambitious intention to silence faculty who express critical perspectives on current US and Israeli policies in the Middle East.

Indeed, those who support US and Israeli policies are conspicuously absent from the lists of those attacked by Campus Watch and allied organizations. Similarly, the profiles of twenty-two of the thirty professors on a website monitoring UCLA faculty criticize their opposition to US policies toward the Middle East, with a special spotlight on those who exercised their first amendment rights by signing petitions voicing their views. David Horowitz’ profiles of the “101 Most Dangerous Academics” also contain a disproportionately large number of Middle East specialists and place many other scholars on the firing line because of the views they espouse on the Middle East. For these watchdogs – and for the much broader community which supports them – to be critical of US policies toward the Middle East or Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza is to be “anti-Israel, anti-Bush, anti-war,” and thus anti-American.

Furthermore, it takes very little to be considered anti-Israel, anti-Bush, anti-war – or even anti-Semitic, another charge sometimes leveled against Middle East specialists who advocate for Palestinian human rights or contend that Israel should comply with international law. Middle East specialists face pressures to keep these
arguments, and the facts underlying them, from university lecture halls. Even factual statements like "the state of Israel was established in May 1948" or calling the West Bank and Gaza Strip "Israeli Occupied Territories" are enough to warrant assault.8

Consequently, Middle East specialists know that when discussing the region’s politics, they are walking onto a personal battlefield. Students sometimes come to class armed with tape recorders or, in the case of Columbia University, video recorders to capture lecture material they deem offensive. There is also unusually high scrutiny of speakers brought to campuses to talk about the Middle East. As former president Jimmy Carter observed about his recent book tour for Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, "My most troubling experience has been the rejection of my offers to speak, for free, about the book on university campuses...".9 His experience is not unique. Even lesser known figures can provoke hostile reactions, not simply to the ideas and facts presented, but to their very right to speak.

These attacks are not limited to individuals. Equally serious has been a vigorous political campaign to keep university-based area studies centers, particularly Middle East centers, from including views critical of US or Israeli policy in the programs they organize. National Resource Center grants earned in peer-review competition from the US Department of Education support many of these centers. Critics tried for several years to persuade Congress to establish an “advisory committee” with the power to sanction centers whose programs it judged to be one-sided. Although this effort was not successful, they did persuade Congress to instruct the National Academy of Sciences to evaluate the National Resource Center program and other US Department of Education programs that support international studies at American universities.

As a result of this environment, Middle East scholars tend to exercise a high degree of self-censorship. Yet this self-censorship undermines the very enterprise in which they are engaged. It is impossible to explain the strength of Hizbullah without discussing its role as a service-provider in Lebanon, for example, or to discuss popular support for Hamas and the outcomes of the recent Palestinian elections without exploring the implications of Israeli policies and actions in the occupied territories. Yet, both of these topics – and many others – can provoke hostile reactions.

The watchdogs have intimidated most Middle East specialists to such an extent that they not only self-censor their statements about the region, but they also abstain from exposing violations of academic freedom. Indeed, the history of this essay is a case in point. Although most Middle East specialists agree that there has been a significant assault on academic freedom since 9/11, most of those approached to write about the topic begged off. The reasons are clear. Those who have drawn attention to the chilled environment within which they work have been pilloried by the same watchdogs.10 Perhaps most disappointing has been the reaction of their academic colleagues. Although Sinologists, Latin Americanists, and Sovietologists faced some of the same kinds of pressures in the past, today they have been notable principally by their absence in coming to the defense of their Middle East studies colleagues.

This leaves Middle East studies faculty, and especially untenured faculty, feeling particularly vulnerable. Indeed, despite the post-9/11 increase in faculty positions in Middle East studies across the United States, the prospects for tenure of Middle East specialists – particularly those at the first-tier research institutions and in the Ivy League – remain very troubled. As David Laitin notes, “The issue of Zionism (for it; against it; neutral about it) divides American academic culture. For decades, every Middle East scholar has been scrutinized on where he or she stood on Zionism. Getting a faculty consensus or a consensus among leaders in the field on a Middle East candidate was well nigh impossible.”11 In the highly polarized context of Middle East studies, it is as difficult to get uniformly glowing letters for scholars deemed to be “pro-Israeli” as it is to get them for scholars believed to be “pro-Arab.”

Department chairs and upper-level administrators are also aware of the politics surrounding Middle East studies, and their awareness appears to play a role in some decisions about hiring and promotion. For sure, the extent of the problem is impossible to know, but examples in which a candidate’s political views about the Middle East have come under scrutiny are numerous. Thus, for instance, an interviewer at a top-tier research institution grilled a job candidate on Israel, and, when dissatisfied with the answers, finally exclaimed, “You don’t have the right to take the Fifth Amendment on these issues! You work on the Middle East!” In the case of another untenured Middle East political scientist, senior faculty members candidly assessed the prospects for tenure by discussing how “moderate” the junior faculty member’s views were, an important consideration, it was thought, in light of the prevalence of faculty with strong pro-Israeli beliefs on campus. Some of this scrutiny may be driven by concerns over political and financial considerations. Universities face very real ramifications from alumni, major donors, and other pressure groups if their fac-
ulty espouses unpopular political views.

Indeed, even the prospect of hiring critics of US and Israeli policies can be enormously taxing. Both Yale University and Princeton University, for example, drew unwanted attention in the last two years when they considered offering endowed chairs to University of Michigan historian Juan Cole and Columbia University historian Rashid Khalidi respectively. In both cases, the prospective recruitments led to intense lobbying from alumni and others who opposed their political views, and in both cases, the universities chose not to extend the expected offers. Whether the decisions not to hire these scholars were due solely to their political positions is debatable but many people drew the conclusion that, as Dan Oren observed of Juan Cole, “‘people whose politics are stronger than their scholarship (...) can’t rely on their scholarship to find them a place at the academy.” Regardless of how the “strength” of politics and scholarship is construed, there are few examples, if any, of Latin Americanists being assessed on the basis of their views of Hugo Chávez or of Europeanists examined about their views of Basque claims for political autonomy in the course of hiring decisions.

The limits on tolerance for opposing viewpoints are not found only among conservative and pro-Israeli forces. Supporters of Israel have complained of feeling unwelcome at MESA and in other Middle East-studies related programs for years, and the post-9/11 climate has only contributed to an “us vs. them” attitude that exacerbates that isolation. In mobilizing to counter conservative watchdogs, many scholars and advocates seek to correct the record and promote tolerance, pluralism, and academic freedom, but some commit the same violations as their opponents. In these cases, it is not the conservative viewpoints but the authors’ right to advocate them that has been attacked, and in others, “debates” between the conservative and liberal personalities degenerate into ad hominem, personal attacks. At a time when we need to understand and debate issues that are critically important to millions of people around the world – including Americans – the degeneration of political argument into personal attack and the disregard of alternative points of view are particularly dangerous and destructive.

“[...] the degeneration of political argument into personal attack and the disregard of alternative points of view are particularly dangerous and destructive.”

This polarization is especially ironic since the demand for Middle East specialists is at a peak. Washington is currently paying unprecedented attention to Middle East specialists, consulting even academics that the Bush administration’s self-appointed watchdogs have attacked. There is also new funding available for scholars working on the Middle East, particularly those doing research deemed “relevant” to national security interests, but even these research opportunities can be a double-edged sword. The definition of ‘relevant research’ is more limited than many Middle East specialists believe it ought to be. “Islam” and “the prospects of democratization” have been designated top priorities, but other theoretically relevant and politically important issues, such as the origins and distribution of state revenues, the development of non-state actors, the relationship between privatization and welfare, migration, demography, and human development, remain unfunded. National security interests and the political perspectives that determine them have always shaped the research agendas of area specialists, but the room for maneuvering in Middle East Studies today is exceptionally narrow.

Why Should Non-Middle East Specialists Care?

These problems are costly not only to Middle East specialists but to the broader academy and the American public. Time spent defending free speech is time taken from research and teaching about the Middle East itself. This outcome may be, in part, what the watchdog groups and their allies hope to achieve. Yet, in so doing, they limit the prospects for open debate of critical policy issues, as well as the development of deeper scholarly and scientific understanding of the Middle East and its politics. Moreover, they have threatened the freedom of speech – one of the major tenets of the very nation that they so vigorously defend. The challenges facing Middle East political scientists also take their toll on the study of comparative politics. Since relatively few senior specialists on Middle East politics are found at the top tier research institutions, well-placed to train graduate students and to carry out productive research agendas, a range of theoretical propositions are not developed or tested, and the region remains a mystery, as the major comparative political studies ignore it altogether.

Today, there is a resurgence in the study of Middle East politics, with high demand for Middle East political scientists and a number of young comparativists taking positions at top universities. The tide seems to be
changing. Yet, unless we recognize what has weakened the field in the past, these young scholars may face the same fates as many of those who came before them. In part, of course, the weakness of the study of Middle East politics is explained by the difficulty of studying the region—the challenges of mastering Middle East languages combined with the problems of studying politics in authoritarian regimes. Yet, it is also partly due to the politicization of the study of the Middle East. To gain the full benefit of a field committed to genuinely comparative research, colleagues must join Middle East scholars in the battle for academic freedom, recognizing the enormous political pressures that Middle East scholars face, understanding the ways in which this will affect their research trajectories and evaluations of their work, and actively working to mitigate the impact of these obstacles.

The challenges facing Middle East specialists are, ultimately, threats to us all. The temptation to ignore the suppression of ideas, to wince, look away and count one’s blessings is strong. Yet, if universities do not provide a place where diverse, challenging and even controversial and disturbing ideas can be expressed and debated, then one of the greatest strengths of American higher education will be lost. The country as a whole will be poorer for it.

Notes

1 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (accessed 1/12/07). The President was not the only political figure to see only two possible positions: Senator Hillary Clinton remarked on September 13, 2001 that “you are either with America in our time of need or you are not.” http://www.hillary.org/hc/Hillary_Clinton_Forum_409_chat1.cgi#Hillary (accessed 1/12/07).


3 The Campus Watch mission statement can be viewed in full at www.campuswatch.org.


6 It should be noted that Israelis and Jews who are critical of US and Israeli policies are not immune from the wrath of these watchdogs. Indeed, they are often among the most strongly attacked.


11 David Laitin points out a more general proposition, that the “greater the political polarization among members of the wider academy in regard to the politics in a region, the more difficult it is for scholars who are experts in that region to get recognized in and appointed to top jobs in political science.” This has the strongest implications for Middle East specialists, but it affects other subfields as well. Unfortunately, time and space constraints made it impossible to fully test this hypothesis here, but it invites an interesting and important study. Personal communication from David Laitin to Ellen Lust-Okar, January 6, 2007.

12 At Princeton University, Rashid Khalidi was eventually offered a position in the history department.


References for this article are on-line at www.nd.edu/~apsacp
The War on Terror: Implications for Research and Data Collection in the Middle East.*

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The War on Terror, ostensibly initiated in response to the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, has had direct and tangible repercussions for comparative research and teaching on the Middle East. For many US-based scholars of the region, the domestic political climate has had a chilling effect, shaping the topics they choose to research and the ways and venues in which they report their findings. While Middle East studies programs were under scrutiny in the US prior to September 11th — in part because of accusations of systematic anti-Israel bias — the War on Terror greatly exacerbated the situation, as witnessed in the creation of organizations such as Campus Watch1 and heated debates over the ethics and legality of outside intervention in academic appointments and promotion. Contentious campus politics and the political climate in the US more generally are undoubtedly the most critical issues confronting US-based Middle East specialists and, accordingly, have received extensive attention elsewhere (Doumani 2006; Gerstmann and Streb 2006; Pipes 2006; Scott 2006) and Lust-Okar et al.’s contribution to this symposium highlights how the War on Terror and the attendant implications for academic freedom affect political science teaching and scholarship on the Middle East in the US.

In my contribution, I focus on another important but lesser known set of concerns, notably the effects on research and data collection processes within the region — both for Middle Eastern scholars and students seeking connections with US-based institutions and for US-based scholars carrying out field research in the Middle East. I highlight several concrete effects of the War on Terror that inhibit the flow of people and resources, including increased restrictions on the matriculation of foreign students in US institutions, on the movements of foreign scholars who wish to travel to academic conferences in the US, and on the importation of academic resource materials that American scholars require from abroad. I also point to a less tangible but equally important factor: the growing climate of suspicion confronting US-based social scientists specializing in the Middle East as they do their work both in the US and in overseas field research sites.

Restrictions on the Flow of Scholars and Resources

For comparativists, interactions with scholars and students from the parts of the world they study not only serve as “reality checks,” but can also bring insights into particular social and political phenomena and promote ways of thinking outside of existing analytical and methodological foundations.2 For these and other reasons, restricting the matriculation of foreign students in US institutions and the movements of foreign scholars into the US has serious costs from a social science perspective.

“ [...] restricting the matriculation of foreign students in US institutions and the movements of foreign scholars into the US has serious costs from a social science perspective.”

In the year following the 9/11 attacks, the number of visitor visas to the US from predominantly Muslim countries dropped by 39 percent (Cainkar 2004b: 248).3 Restrictions imposed by the US government are not the only inhibiting factors on flows of Middle Eastern scholars and students to the US. The Government of Syria recently cancelled its participation in Fulbright programs, preventing Syrian scholars and students from attending or affiliating with US academic institutions. It seems reasonable to presume that this decision was at least partially connected to the international politics of the War on Terror. Thus, tensions between the American and Syrian governments may be preventing scholarly exchanges at precisely the time when they are most needed.

On the other hand, with the passage of time, some restrictions have loosened. Since 2002, restrictions on the entry of foreign visitors to the US have eased and the evidence indicates that applications from and enrollment at US universities by foreign graduate students increased in 2005 following a three-year period of consecutive declines. A report by the
Council of Graduate Students (CGS) released on November 7, 2005 notes that first-time enrollment of graduate students from Middle Eastern countries at US graduate institutions rose by 11 percent between 2004 and 2005 while enrollments from other countries, notably China, India, and Korea, also increased. The report cites improved admission and streamlined visa processes as key causal factors behind this trend (Kujawa 2005).

Even as the data suggest greater opportunities for students from the Middle East and other regions to enroll in US institutions, restrictions on the movements of foreign scholars who wish to travel to academic conferences and take up visiting or permanent teaching positions in the US remain issues of great concern. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has made this a high priority issue. Robert O’Neill, a professor of law at the University of Virginia School of Law, former president of the University of Virginia, and chair of the AAUP Committee on Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis, contends that the “exclusion of foreign scholars has assumed almost epidemic proportions” (O’Neill 2006). This trend is hardly confined to scholars from the Middle East and, indeed, O’Neill (2006: 1-2) cites several cases in which Latin American scholars with perceived sympathies for leftist movements and governments encountered problems in obtaining visas to take up positions at US institutions. The case of Tariq Ramadan, a professor of Islamic Studies and a philosopher of religion and conflict resolution, is the most high-profile instance in which a scholar of Middle Eastern origin was blocked from taking up a post at a US institution – the Henry Luce Professorship in the Joan Kroc Institute at the University of Notre Dame. Professor Ramadan learned one week before his expected departure for Indiana that his visa had been revoked under a section of the USA Patriot Act barring foreigners who have endorsed or espoused terrorist activities, although neither Ramadan’s academic career nor his publications support these accusations. In January 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Academy of Religion (AAR), the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), and the PEN American Center filed a lawsuit in the Southern District Court of New York on behalf of Professor Ramadan and won. In September 2006, the Department of Homeland Security dropped the accusation that Professor Ramadan had endorsed terrorism but rejected his visa application on the grounds that he had donated money to two Palestinian organizations that, in turn, gave money to Hamas.

American policy towards the region and increased scrutiny of Arabs and Muslims traveling to or living in the US may have deterred Middle Eastern scholars from participating in meetings, conferences and other scholarly events held in the US. The aftermath of 9/11 led to a reorientation of Arab tourism away from the US and Europe towards favored Arab destinations, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates (Cainkar 2004a) and, to some extent, scholars and students from the region have also chosen to limit visits to, exchanges with, and participation in US and European academic institutions and events. Colleagues at institutions in the Arab world are reluctant to attend conferences in the US, in part because they do not want to experience the stress and aggravation of entering and traveling in the US. At a time when travel and data collection in the Middle East are increasingly difficult for American scholars – an issue that I address below – opportunities for scholars from the region to attend conferences and events in the US is especially important for academic exchange.

“At a time when travel and data collection in the Middle East are increasingly difficult for American scholars [...] opportunities for scholars from the region to attend conferences and events in the US is especially important for academic exchange.”

The importation of academic resource materials that American scholars require from abroad may also be in jeopardy as a result of the War on Terror. An AAUP newsletter of January/February 2005 reported that the US Customs Service had “torn apart shipments of [an AAUP member’s] books in order to inspect those books on Arabic or Islamic topics in order to determine whether the books promote or encourage terrorism” and indicated that this was not an isolated case (AAUP 2005). All the books in the shipment were published in the US and had been shipped to the overseas distributor, but problems arose when the books were sent back to the US press by the distributor. Neither I nor other political scientists specializing in the Middle East whom I contacted have personally experienced this problem, probably because the comparatively small quantities of materials we transport from multiple, individual field research trips do not arouse suspicion. But the inspection and confiscation of materi-
als indicate an imposed narrowing of the kinds of sources that are and are not permissible, potentially inhibiting research and scholarship on the Middle East at precisely the moment when they are most needed.

The Double Bind: Navigating Climates of Suspicion in the US and Abroad

The War on Terror and post 9/11 geopolitics have undoubtedly focused greater attention on the work of comparativists specializing in the Middle East. In some respects, this is a welcome change given the long history of marginalization of the sub-field (Chaudhry 1994; Lustick 2000; Tessler 1999). At the same time, political scientists focusing on the region increasingly engage directly in broader disciplinary debates about democratization and persistent authoritarianism, the politics of economic change, identity politics, ethnic conflict, and other germane topics.

But this newfound attention also forces comparativists with Middle East expertise to navigate a delicate and difficult balance. On the one hand, Middle East specialists must be careful how they package their findings for US scholarly and public audiences as well as how they present material to students. The controversies and sensitivities around events in the region such as the Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Lebanese crisis, to name a few, invite attacks on Middle East specialists, who are more readily viewed with suspicion than scholars of other regions and even accused of apologizing for terrorism by public, self-declared watchdog groups and government officials. Perhaps no other area focus in political science has been subject to public and media scrutiny as much as Middle East politics, compelling scholars to defend their social scientific credentials while carrying out the multiple duties of their academic careers.

At the same time, the process of data collection has become all the more challenging. Field research in the Middle East was always difficult (as it is or was in other developing regions): repressive, authoritarian regimes effectively precluded research on a wide array of topics and prevented the use of methodologies such as survey research within their territories. Gathering documents and other resources is difficult in places where critical scholarship – by local and foreign researchers alike – is greeted with suspicion by local authorities. When I carried out doctoral research in 1998-2000 on the effects of trade liberalization on business-government relations in Morocco and Tunisia – a relatively innocuous topic – businesspeople, professional association representatives, labor union leaders, and government officials often doubted my academic credentials, assuming instead that I was a CIA agent, representative of a multinational corporation, or World Bank consultant and that the data collected would be used for purposes other than academic research.

But the ill will that has developed towards the US as a result of American foreign policy in the region has complicated the research process for US citizens, who increasingly face an uphill battle in convincing local informants that their goals are purely scholarly. Reluctance to meet with and open up to American researchers is in part due to fear of local retribution and reputational loss, which were matters of concern in many Middle Eastern countries prior to the War on Terror, but are now greatly compounded by resentment towards US foreign policy actions and goals in the region. On a personal level, I have had only positive experiences in my everyday interactions with people in the region. As a scholar and researcher, however, I find it increasingly difficult to set up meetings and to elicit meaningful information from informants with whom I have not had extensive prior contact because, as an American citizen and a professor at a US institution, I am often associated with American foreign policy. Reactions to American researchers are of course not uniform within a given society or across different countries in the region. For example, in my current research in Lebanon, which focuses on the politics of social welfare provision by religious organizations, different parties and groups in this deeply divided society have different perspectives on US foreign policy goals in the region. Indeed, a major cleavage underlying the current crisis in Lebanon is based on contending visions of the appropriate domestic relationship with the US and other Western powers and institutions. On the one hand, anti-American groups are wary about my intentions and institutional affiliation given my nationality. On the other hand, even groups supportive of the Bush administration’s foreign objectives in the region are not always receptive to me as an American researcher because of concerns about my own personal views on the conflict.

Strategies and Responses

These obstacles are not insurmountable, but they do require extensive trust-building, repeat contacts with institutions and individuals, and attestations of scholarly credentials by locally respected academics, journalists and officials (Cammett 2007). Maintaining contact with informants and relevant institutions while away from field sites is also important to reiterate the scholar’s commitment to the research. In the end, the fact that so many people, parties, and organi-
On the domestic front, academic institutions can play a critical role in fostering good social science research on the region. Universities, academic departments and colleagues can shield their faculty from unfair attacks on the scholarly credentials of political scientists studying the Middle East. Even if the findings do not conform to a preferred viewpoint, as a matter of principle it is important to defend the scholarship and teaching of Middle East experts.

Even if the findings do not conform to a preferred viewpoint [...] it is important to defend the scholarship and teaching of Middle East experts [...]."

Notes

* I thank Ellen Lust-Okar, Julia Lynch, Ben Read and Hugh Roberts for comments on earlier drafts and take sole responsibility for any errors or omissions.

1 See http://www.campus-watch.org/.

2 In a recent interview, Przeworski (2007) even suggests that “US-trained foreigners” are better positioned to study their own countries and regions than Americans trained in US institutions.

3 Within the broad category of Muslim countries, there was wide variation: The number of visitor visas issued to citizens of Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of most of the perpetrators of the attacks, decreased by 67 percent, while visas approved to Jordanians, Indonesians and Moroccans fell by 37 percent, 29 percent and 13 percent respectively (Cainkar 2004: 248).


5 Louise Cainkar reports that she contacted various professional associations about attendance at annual meetings and all were reporting decreases in foreign participation from the Middle East in 2002 and 2003 (Louise Cainkar, personal communication, December 17, 2006).

References for this article are on-line at http://www.nd.edu/~apsacp
Reports that the FBI would be watching which URLs I was loading particularly concerned me. I had just started the research for my recent book, and was spending hours surfing the web for the names and addresses of Muslim political organizations across Europe. There was no way to know which organization or individuals the authorities would be watching, so how could I observe restrictions that were unknown to me? Lawyers informed me it was fortunate that I had obtained US citizenship, because otherwise it might be difficult to defend me if I got “into trouble.”

Universities have turned over records of students and the FBI has paid visits to deans and provosts, but the impact has been less than anticipated. My own fears proved unfounded. In retrospect five years later, 9/11 has in many respects been good for our business. As a colleague said to me, “Suicide terrorism is the new growth industry for researchers.” As was true with the collapse of communism in 1989, the War on Terror poses a challenge to our discipline. Political scientists became aware of their tremendous ignorance about Islam, Muslims, ethno-religious conflict, and contemporary political extremism, as well as security threats that had not been part of earlier debates raging between realists and constructivists.

We reacted to events by studying them, but the new political realities introduced by 9/11 have set off passions that threaten to impinge upon academic freedom with far greater consequences than the Patriot Act. Scholars have found their work attacked for excessive sympathy to Muslims or, vice versa, insensitivity to Israel and Jews. In Britain, academic unions have launched a movement to boycott Israeli scholars, except those “conscientious Israeli academics and intellectuals opposed to their state’s colonial and racist policies.”

Political scientists will recognize both campaigns as textbook, conventional resource-mobilization activism. Activists select their target for symbolic reasons, mobilize notables and friendly associations for the course, and link the target at hand to larger questions of injustice. Unfortunately, we are now the focus of the activism.

“ [...] the new political realities introduced by 9/11 have set off passions that threaten to impinge upon our academic freedom with far greater consequences than the Patriot Act.”

In 2002, Mona Baker, a professor at the University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology, dismissed two Israeli scholars, Miriam Schlesinger and Gideon Toury, from the editorial boards of two journals, which she edits. Baker is a professor of translation studies and runs several websites devoted to the Palestinian cause. Toury is a professor at Tel Aviv University and Schlesinger at Bar Ilan. She is also a former head of Amnesty International in Israel. Neither had done anything to incur their dismissal. Baker was inspired by a petition launched by Steven Rose, a biologist, at the Open University, that proposed a boycott of Israeli scholars. Another resolution, circulated at the same time, called for a scientific and financial boycott, but not an end to collaboration with Israeli scholars. “I deplore the Israeli state,” said Baker in defense of her decision, “Miriam knew how I felt and that they would have to go because of the current situation [in Israel].”

The Anti-Apartheid Campaign is the model for the boycott campaign. “Not only can we learn about Israel by examining apartheid in South Africa, but we can also help to take the Palestinian cause forward by learning from the South African anti-apartheid struggle, the manner in which it framed its objectives and the strategies and tactics that it used,” Baker argues on her website.

Britain’s two academic unions, the Association of University Teachers (AUT) and the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (Natfhe), supported the boycott movement. The AUT passed a resolution that called for boycotts of Bar Ilan and Haifa Universities in April 2005. Weeks later, a hastily called recall conference revoked all statements mentioning a boycott and called instead for “practical solidarity” with unionists in Israel and Palestine. Natfhe, which organized professors at the polytechs, passed a boycott resolution in 2006. Support for a boycott appears to be growing, and the new University and College Union (UCU) debate resolutions at the upcoming June 2007 annual meeting.

Recent, well-known casualties are Tony Judt (NYU), Juan Cole (Michigan), John Mearsheimer (Chicago), and Stephen Walt (Harvard). Former President Jimmy Carter, who has been subjected to rough treatment for using the term
‘apartheid’ to describe Israeli treatment of Palestinians, can be added to the list, as can Tony Kushner, who was given an honorary doctorate by Brandeis in May 2006 despite protests. Kushner’s mistake was to portray Israeli self-doubt in his film, “Munich.”

Judt found himself out of a speaking engagement with only hours to spare after a phone call from the ADL and the American Jewish Committee and hostile attacks in the New York Sun. Cole was hung out to dry in the Wall Street Journal for something he never said. Mearsheimer and Walt were subjected to the “combo special” treatment, a combination of tabloid and blog attacks together with trustee intervention. Kushner was subjected to a campaign organized by Zionists of America (ZOA) and the New York Post, which linked the attack to other issues at Brandeis: a visiting professorship to Khalil Shikaki, a Palestinian, and an exchange agreement with the Al-Quds University.

There is a predictable pattern to the serial “unmasking” of the above-mentioned victims. Each has been subjected to accusations of anti-Semitism, “academic malpractice,” “shoddy research,” and much worse, by all or some combination of the following: The New York Sun, The New York Post, Martin Peretz in The New Republic, ZOA, The Anti-Defamation League, and Campus Watch. Alan Dershowitz, too, is always on call. The political left gets committees to oppose it vehemently is to endanger Jews.”7 Faintly echoing Lenin, she explained what has to be done. “The only solutions I can imagine are to write back, speak back, teach back and fight back. Hand-wringing, inaction and silence will not help. Let all Jews who are truly progressive, liberal, not self-hating and not anti-Zionist develop a clear set of ideas to address these individuals specifically. Let organizations that fight anti-Semitism have special divisions to combat Jewish anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism.” Her final recommendation was to “sue for libel.” It was not a slip of the pen. When asked about her definition of anti-Semitism by Alex Beam, a Boston Globe columnist, Reinharz shot back, “Your notion of anti-Semitism is outdated.” “You might believe that anti-Semitism was what Hitler was doing. I believe there are many forms of anti-Semitism, and that includes desire to do harm to the state of Israel.”8

Celebrities are not the only victims of the campaign to eliminate Jewish anti-Semitism. On April 30, the President of Brandeis, Jehuda Reinharz, had a student’s exhibit removed from the university library. The exhibit was called “Voices of Palestine” and was put up by Lior Halperin, a psychology major. It displayed drawing and statements made by children and teenagers in a West Bank youth center. Lior is an Israeli, a former soldier, and a peace activist. The exhibit was her end-of-year project for the co-existence program and had been exhibited for four days before it was removed. She has now left Brandeis.

Reinharz’s reasons for removing her exhibit are murky. Two students had complained to a dean of students that one of the exhibits, which depicted a map of Israel with the Palestinian flag drawn in, was “offensive.” Subsequently, a spokesperson for Brandeis claimed that the exhibit was
The legal worries created by the USA Patriot Act did not keep my recent class on “Islam in West” from surfing the net for Jihadist declarations, reading Al-Jazeera online, and watching videos of suicide terrorists preparing to blow themselves up. My biggest challenge was a Jewish student who became agitated when I described the idea that the Qur’an is the literal revealed word of God as a creation myth. “You can’t say that! It is offensive!”

I have not steered entirely free of political flack. Campus Watch ran a story stressing my Brandeis affiliation. Danish neo-nationalists tag me. A Danish minister talked darkly about Danes living abroad who abuse their knowledge of the language to smear the country. A German reviewer dismissed my research, “If we do not have a Clash of Civilization with Muslims, what do we have?” An internal review committee at Brandeis at one point suggested that I rigged my research for my book, The Islamic Challenge, to make Muslims “look good.” My colleagues fought successfully on my behalf, and Brandeis’ Provost found I had been subject to biased treatment and annulled the statement. Yet as long as I work in this area of research I will continue to worry about being ambushed by politics.

Within the US, the reactions to the academic boycott of colleagues from Israel – or for that matter boycotts of any group of scholars – have been overwhelmingly negative. The MLA denounced the dismissals of Toury and Schlesinger as “grotesque” violations of academic freedom. Congressman Michael E. Capuano (D-MA) submitted a resolution (H.RES 499) comparing the boycott campaign to the Nazi purges. When the British academic unions passed boycott resolutions, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) strongly condemned the boycott. The APSA joined the protests. Congressman Gary Ackerman (D-NY) protested as president of the International Council of Jewish Parliamentarians. So did the Israeli Minister of Education, Yuli (Yael) Tamir, a political theorist.

The campaign to police what academics say about Israel has proven a more divisive issue. The Judt affaire resulted in two statements of protest signed by public intellectuals, writers, and academics. Yet, all is not well. No congressmen have defended the freedom of academics to say unpopular things. The AAUP was strongly opposed to the boycott campaign but when plans were made for a conference between boycott proponents and opponents to be held at Bellagio, the Rockefeller Foundation’s conference center in Northern Italy, in February 2006, the boycott opponents complained about a “lack of balance.” The conference was cancelled when the conference papers that were mailed out included a link to a website specializing in Holocaust denial. The AAUP called it an “inadvertent and careless” error, but the damage was done. The cancelled conference was the subject of intense controversy in Academe, the AAUP’s magazine, where one of the organizers, Joan Wallach Scott (Institute of Advanced Study) complained of “a systematic campaign for ‘clarification’ of the purposes of the conference.” Scott also argued that it was acceptable for “teaching purposes” to send out an article from Holocaust deniers. It resulted in two statements of protest signed by public intellectuals, writers, and academics. Yet, all is not well. No congressmen have defended the freedom of academics to say unpopular things. The AAUP was strongly opposed to the boycott campaign but when plans were made for a conference between boycott proponents and opponents to be held at Bellagio, the Rockefeller Foundation’s conference center in Northern Italy, in February 2006, the boycott opponents complained about a “lack of balance.” The conference was cancelled when the conference papers that were mailed out included a link to a website specializing in Holocaust denial. The AAUP called it an “inadvertent and careless” error, but the damage was done. The cancelled conference was the subject of intense controversy in Academe, the AAUP’s magazine, where one of the organizers, Joan Wallach Scott (Institute of Advanced Study) complained of “a systematic campaign for ‘clarification’ of the purposes of the conference.”

“Balance” has always been the battle cry raised by groups who insist that they too should have their say. The difference is that it has now become acceptable for tabloids and advocacy groups to use all means possible to discredit scholars whose conclusions they dislike. The balance requirement, of course, implies that we know where the center is. We would all fail to do our job if we hewed to an imagined equilibrium in controversies. The “accuracy in scholarship” campaigns...
are equally problematic, when they are levied by watchdog groups and are parlayed into accusations of “scholarly misconduct” or worse.

As colleagues we can all agree that we need to keep our heads and allow scholars with whom we disagree have their say. Many of us have tenure, after all, so what can happen? Unfortunately, university presidents and trustees have proven themselves all too susceptible to pressure politics involving the press, student sentiments, and threats of withdrawal of money. Universities must be accountable to the public, but what do we do when the public is selective and its demands unreasonable? Sadly, resolutions and protest letters from learned society carry no weight in this context.

Notes


4 Interview with The Sunday Telegraph, 17 November 2002, copied from Mona Baker’s personal website, which is devoted to her activities regarding the boycott. http://monabaker.com.


6 ZOA and Schwartz are at the time of this writing on to his next campaign against Brandeis: the appointment of Natana DeLong-Bas, an author of a book on Wahhabism, as a visiting lecturer in Brandeis’ Near Eastern and Judaic Studies department, see http://www.nypost.com/seven/01052007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/brandeis_self_hate_opedcolumnists_stephen_schwartz.htm. Schwartz also wrote a book about Wahhabism.

7 http://www.thejewishadvocate.com/this_weeks_issue/columnists/reinhartz/?content_id=2305


9 www.campus-watch.org/weblog/id/28

10 Then APSA president, Margaret Levi, sent a letter to the AUT stating, “The American Political Science Association, through action by its Council and its Committee on Professional Ethics, Rights, and Freedoms, supports the views expressed in the May 3, 2005 statement by the AAUP against academic boycotts. We join in condemning the resolutions of the AUT that damage academic freedom and we call for their repeal,” see http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/aut1.pdf.


In the following essay, we discuss the Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grants competition in the National Science Foundation’s Political Science Program. An overview of the requirements is initially presented. Then, the success rate over the last four years is discussed, as well as what makes a good proposal. Finally, other sources of dissertation support are considered.

Basics of NSF’s Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grants

The Political Science Program at the National Science Foundation holds a competition each spring for Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grants (DDIG). We accept proposals from any field of political science as long as they have theoretical and empirical components. The deadline for these proposals is January 15th. The maximum duration of the proposed project is 12 months and the maximum proposed budget is $12,000. The student is limited to ten pages within which to describe his or her project. Additional room is provided for refer-
ences, biographical sketches, a budget, and a justification of the budget.

There are two other things that graduate students should keep in mind when applying for a DDIG. First, the principal investigator for the project is formally the student’s dissertation advisor and the student is a co-principal investigator. While it is expected that the student will write the proposal and do the research entailed in it, the student’s advisor must be the principal investigator. Second, each proposal must include a letter from the faculty member serving as the project’s principal investigator. This letter should indicate his/her confidence in the scientific rigor and value of the proposed dissertation research project. While the letter may be emailed or sent by regular mail to the program directors, it is preferred that it be submitted via Fastlane with the rest of the proposal.3

After a proposal is submitted, it is reviewed by three panelists. The panel consists of twelve members. The twelve are highly respected and well known political scientists from around the country. They have a wide variety of substantive interests as well as methodological approaches. Each is carefully selected in order to make sure that the panel reflects the field of political science. In addition, as much as possible, the program officers try to select panelists who represent different types of academic institutions and geographical regions. Efforts are also made to make sure the panel is representative of the field with regards to race and gender. Finally, the panelists tend to be people who are very broadminded when it comes to what defines “good” political science.

The panel meets in April to discuss the proposals. Each proposal is then placed in one of three categories: “must fund,” “fund,” and “do not fund.” After the panel meeting, the program officers, using the reviews, the panel discussion, and the ranking of the proposals, make recommendations to the Division Director concerning which proposal should be funded. Given the limitations on the program’s budget, not all proposals placed in the fund category will be recommend- ed for funding. The principal investigator and co-principal investigator are informed of the disposition of their proposal sometime between late April and early June. Each set of investigators are provided with a summary of the panel discussion and copies of the reviews regardless of the funding decision.

Funding of Proposals

The success rate for proposals has varied over the last four fiscal years. During fiscal year 2003, the Political Science Program received 70 dissertation proposals of which 25 were funded. This resulted in a funding rate of 35.7 percent. During fiscal year 2004, the Political Science Program received 54 dissertation proposals of which 19 were funded. This resulted in a funding rate of 35.2 percent. During fiscal year 2005, the Political Science Program received 73 dissertation proposals of which 15 were funded. This resulted in a funding rate of 20.5 percent. During fiscal year 2006, the Political Science Program received 94 dissertation proposals of which 16 were funded. This resulted in a funding rate of 17 percent. While the funding rate has decreased over this period, the Program has seen a dramatic increase in the number of proposals submitted. The number of submissions has almost doubled during this period. Unfortunately, the amount of funds available for dissertation awards has remained constant with approximately $120,000 allotted each year. The Political Science Program Officers will be revisiting this budget next year. During the last fiscal year, the program’s annual budget has increased from 6 million dollars to 7.2 million dollars. Some of these additional funds will be allocated to funding dissertations.

“ [...] the Program has seen a dramatic increase in the number of proposals submitted. [...] Unfortunately, the amount of funds available for dissertation awards has remained constant [...]. ”

When one looks at the portfolio of dissertation awards made each year by the Political Science program, it should be clear that the panel and the program officers are not biased towards one subfield or methodological approach. For example, during this current fiscal year, awards were made to a political theorist who plans to conduct experiments, a comparativist using qualitative methods to examine the role of civil society in promoting political stability, and an Americanist studying the impact of magazine advertisements and articles on the gender gap.

While this is a very disparate group of awards, they do share several things in common. First, all are based on a clearly delineated theory. The theoretical approaches used may vary widely, but each has a clear foundation in a theoretical approach. Second, each proposes to test rigorously hypotheses derived from their theoretical perspective. These tests can come in many forms. In several cases, the tests involved doing experiments. In others, it involved elite surveys, the results of which
Datasets

were to be examined using qualitative approaches. In other cases, advanced statistical techniques were to be used to examine secondary data or data from mass surveys to be conducted under the supervision of the co-principal investigator.

“ [...] the Program [...] does not favor one discipline or method over another. Instead, the focus is on whether the proposal is theoretically based and whether tests for the theory are provided. Both are required.”

While the Program does have a selection bias, it does not favor one discipline or method over another. Instead, the focus is on whether the proposal is theoretically based and whether tests for the theory are provided. Both are required.

Other Sources of Dissertation Support at the NSF

In addition to the Political Science Program, there are other programs within the Division of Social and Economic Sciences at the National Science Foundation that also fund Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grants. If you are doing decision theoretic work and/or experiments, a natural home for your DDIG proposal might be the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program. If your proposal focuses more on mass behavior, you might want to consider sending your proposal to the Sociology Program. If you have a more methodological bent and see your dissertation as developing methods to be used in the social sciences and elsewhere, you might want to consider applying to the Methodology, Measurement, and Statistics Program. If your proposal considers public policy questions, you may want to submit it to the Science and Society Program. This is also the case if it deals with studies of science or social science. If your proposal focuses on the judicial system or law, you should apply to the Law and Social Sciences Program.


Notes

1 If January 15th falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or the observed birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr., proposals are due by the close of business on the next working day.

2 The one exception to the budget limit is that students doing international research, having a formal affiliation with a foreign research institution, may be eligible for additional funding. Interested students should contact the appropriate area program in the National Science Foundation’s Office of International Science and Engineering (OISE) for more information.

3 The letter can be submitted in the supplementary document section of the proposal.

Improving Data Quality: What Is To Be Done?

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The efforts of political scientists to submit their hypotheses to systematic and rigorous empirical testing can be seriously undermined by low quality data. Yet problems with quality in prominent datasets have been documented1 and some scholars have endeavored to improve upon existing datasets, including suggesting novel measures.2 In addition, methodologists have worked to devise technical solutions for various problems in large datasets.3 But these painstaking efforts at evaluation and correction have so far received less attention and indeed they serve more as indicators of the scope of the problem rather than as a comprehensive solution. Unfortunately, inattentiveness to data quality and the uncritical use of problematic datasets remains the norm in political science. This leads us to ask: Why do problems with dataset quality persist? In a separate paper we proposed a new
framework for evaluating data quality that examined the links in the supply chain that are crucial for the production of any dataset, and in particular we focused on the incentives as well as capabilities of the principal actors in the chain (Herrera and Kapur, 2006). Despite strong disciplinary consensus about the behavioral effects of incentives, their effect on actors working with data has been neglected. In this note, we ask what can be done to increase the incentives for academics to improve the quality of the data that they use in their work. Our aim is not to question the utility of quantitative research or of large datasets. On the contrary, we hope that by shedding light on the construction and use of datasets we can help change the disciplinary incentives in favor of the development and use of higher quality data.

Data Supply Chain

Our approach to solving data quality problems begins with the recognition that multiple actors construct data in a process that we call the “data supply chain.” These actors have varying capabilities and incentive structures, which can have significant consequences for data quality.

Figure 1 schematically represents the data supply chain. It begins with the original respondents – individuals, households, firms, and government agencies – or the sources of the data. The data collection agencies – state statistical institutions and private firms – are the next links in the data chain. State agencies can be both respondents and suppliers of data. As we move downstream, the data are supplied to international organizations, which have emerged as critical repositories of comparable cross-national datasets. While scholars sometimes collect primary data, they are generally consumers rather than primary producers of data. Consequently, they generally receive data at the end of the production process. By this point, however, the data may be seriously compromised as a result of the accumulation of distortions in the previous stages. Moreover, given the current set of incentives facing academics, datasets are unlikely to be improved at this juncture.

For scholars, the costs of improving datasets or creating new data of high quality are personal and immediate while the benefits are social and long-term. This wedge between personal and social benefits as well as inter-temporal discounting inevitably leads to insufficient scrutiny. The result is an ongoing recycling of existing data, often of modest quality, and an undersupply of new high quality data. Professional rewards within academia are based on the quantity and quality of publications evaluated largely on their theoretical and methodological contributions rather than the quality of data used in the work. Not surprisingly, this incentive structure results in scholars (especially non-tenured faculty) devoting their limited time to theory formulation and hypothesis testing using off-the-shelf data, instead of undertaking the exceedingly costly task of collecting new data that would better match measurable indicators to concepts, or even making improvements to the quality of existing datasets.

What Is To Be Done?

A frequent refrain among social scientists is that bad data are better than no data. We reject this false choice. “No data” or “bad data” are not the only options because scholars need not be complacent with the status quo, and improvement of datasets is an ongoing challenge. There always will be shortcomings and limitations in datasets, and the costs of using poor data must be weighed against the opportunity costs of the effort required to improve the data. However, lowering the costs and changing the incentives for improving data quality will make it more likely that high quality data will be the norm in the future.

We offer four broad suggestions for improving data quality. As a first step, researchers should carefully scrutinize datasets. Researchers can subject them to some simple “smell-tests” by asking a number of questions: Who created the data? What were the capabilities of the statistical agency (an especially important issue for developing countries)? What were their motivations to collect the data? How independent or autonomous was this agency? Was it governed by an...
external actor with a vested interest? Would organizational goals contaminate the underlying measure? Asking these questions will make the user of the data more aware of its possible quality problems. Empirically, one of the easiest ways to recognize data quality problems is to compare discrepancies among sources or inconsistencies within a publication series, and see if other users have found problems with the data. Rather than relying only on one data source, researchers could compare data from different sources and consider the competence and independence of those sources. In addition, reviews and analyses of existing datasets are increasing, and researchers should look for and consult this work. Munck and Verkuilen, for example, have evaluated nine datasets on democracy (Munck and Verkuilen 2002a).

A second step in improving data quality is to pay close attention to the incentives for data creation. Rather than treating data quality problems as an unfortunate result of ignorance or incompetence, scholars should consider the incentives facing respondents, statistical offices, international organizations, and peers in the data production process. Moreover, given the degree to which researchers analyze the effects of incentives, they should be more sensitive to how their own incentive structures affect their efforts to improve data quality. The issue has been emphasized by Cheibub (1999) and Widner (1999).

Third, the academic community needs to consider ways to lower the costs of data quality. Increasing the transparency and availability of the technical details of datasets, including coding rules, would enable its users to engage the data critically. The State Department analysis of terrorism provides a textbook case of how transparency of coding rules and availability of data can improve data quality. In April 2004, the State Department issued a report entitled “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” claiming terrorist attacks had declined in recent years. Using the State Department’s own guidelines which accompanied the report, Alan Krueger and David Laitin reviewed these data and found that “significant” terrorist attacks had actually risen between 2002 and 2003. They published this review of the data in an op-ed piece in the Washington Post and in an article in Foreign Affairs (2004). In response, the State Department acknowledged that the report was wrong.

“A frequent refrain among social scientists is that bad data is better than no data. [...] ‘No data’ or ‘bad data’ are not the only options, because scholars need not be complacent with the status quo [...] .”

With more people able to recognize a dataset’s problems, the costs of improving its quality can be reduced. A few journals now mandate that authors make their datasets available upon the request of readers. This is a positive step, but there are only minimal enforcement mechanisms for such rules. If authors fail to provide data or provide it in a form that is not very usable, the burden of trying to access it falls on the reader. It would be less costly for individual researchers to check and improve the quality of datasets if journals instead made the datasets available on their websites (as is the case with The Journal of Conflict Resolution). In addition, a relatively low-cost error-revelation mechanism such as a “letters to the editor” section could be adopted by journals. International Security, for example, already has such a forum, but many journals do not. The proliferation of such mechanisms would have two effects: it would increase incentives for authors to attend to data quality by increasing the likelihood of being publicly criticized, and it would provide other scholars with important information regarding data errors, thus improving quality in future work with the same datasets.

Fourth, institutions have to get involved in improving data quality. Modest changes such as supporting more forums for error discussion and greater transparency in how the data were gathered would be helpful. On a larger scale, major research funding agencies such as the NSF, the World Bank, and UN need to signal their commitment to data quality by providing greater resources for independent external validation of their data. Data quality in large grants could be improved if there were funding specifically earmarked for cleaning up existing or newly collected datasets and making them more widely accessible. Although the NSF does have an archiving requirement, it does not appear to be systematically enforced.

The American Political Science Association (APSA) needs to take a leading role in advocating and codifying higher data quality norms. APSA, as an institution, might be able to overcome collective action problems among field and sub-field sections, as well as among individual scholars. Given the importance of cross-country datasets and the considerable scope for improving data comparisons across countries, we believe that
debates regarding the merits of area studies versus cross-national large-N studies need to shift toward the possibilities for collaboration between the two approaches. Joint work between area specialists and methodologists could considerably enhance the quality of cross-national datasets. Given collective action problems inherent in organizing such efforts, APSA or other umbrella institutions are better placed to play a leadership role in supporting such partnerships.

Finally, and on a more positive note, we wish to draw attention to some promising recent developments with regard to the incentive structures for researchers who construct datasets. The Comparative Politics section of APSA, for example, now offers an award for datasets, and this newsletter reviews new datasets. In addition, a relatively new section of APSA, the Qualitative Methods section, is providing a forum for critical scrutiny of datasets. Moreover, there is an increasing number of panels at professional meetings that examine the quality of datasets on a range of topics including ethnicity, democracy, and war. Institutional mechanisms for changing scholars’ incentives – i.e. reducing costs for producing high-quality data and increasing rewards for their use – are growing stronger. For instance, the increasing trend toward using randomized trials in the social sciences rewards researchers who produce high quality primary data with publication success.

There are undoubtedly additional ways to improve data quality that we have not considered here. Nonetheless, we believe that greater attention by researchers as well as a focus on incentives, costs, and collective action problems associated with improving data quality are a good beginning.

Notes
4. For example, Becker’s seminal article on crime (1968), alerted researchers to errors due to under-reporting by victims and under-recording by police in officially reported crime statistics.
5. Munck and Verkuilen’s work (2002a) was followed by three discussion pieces as well as a response by the authors: see Coppedge (2002), Marshall et al. (2002), Ward (2002), and Munck and Verkuilen (2002b). For another evaluation of democracy measures, see Collier and Adcock (1999). For a painstaking analysis of trade statistics, see Yeats (1990) and Rozanski and Yeats (1994). On comparisons of governance indices, see Kaufmann et al. (2002). On rule of law, see Berkowitz et al. (2003); and on ethnicity, see Laitin and Posner (2001).

References for this article are on-line at www.nd.edu/~apsacp

Dataset Announcements

Elections and Democracy in Africa: 1989-2003

This dataset was developed by Staffan I. Lindberg, University of Florida. The dataset was originally developed to measure the “democraticness” of elections in Africa focusing on three dimensions of democracy: participation, competition, and legitimacy; but has since been extended to address issues of women’s legislative empowerment, effects of electoral systems, and opposition party strategies during democratization. It includes original data on eleven indicators of the democratic qualities of elections, as well as information on electoral system, women in parliament, political parties, Freedom House ratings, and regime breakdown. The dataset includes all executive and legislative elections in sub-Saharan African 1989 to July 2003 but also includes earlier elections for countries such as Botswana that held multiparty elections before 1989. A total of 232 elections (97 presidential and 135 legislative polls) from 44 countries are coded.

The background information for coding of cases on the original variables was solicited from a larger number of sources going beyond the standard data sources to enhance reliability. All background information was also collated in a special file for each country to make replication and cross-checking of coding decisions practical (and not just a theoretical possibility). The dataset, plus file information and coding rules, are available for download at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/lindberg/
Further information on the dataset, sources, and coding can be found in the author’s book *Democracy and Elections in Africa* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

**Survey on American Civil Engagement Dataset**

The data from the Center for Democracy and Civil Society’s US “Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy” (CID) survey, conducted in the spring/summer of 2005, are now publicly available. The survey presents an unusually broad and deep picture of American civic engagement in comparative perspective. Among other themes, it includes a comprehensive set of questions on the composition and diversity of informal social networks, involvement in voluntary associations, democratic values, and tolerance. A subset of the survey was replicated from the European Social Survey (ESS), thus allowing for comparisons between the U.S. and 22 European countries.

The U.S. CID survey was directed by Marc Morje Howard (Georgetown University), with the assistance of associate directors James L. Gibson (Washington University in St. Louis) and Dietlind Stolle (McGill University).

For more information on the survey, including instructions for downloading the data, see www.uscidsurvey.org.

For more on the Center for Democracy and Civil Society (CDACS) at Georgetown University, see http://cdacs.georgetown.edu.

**Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy Aggregate Dataset**

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have posted on the Internet the data used in their recent book, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). This cross-sectional dataset contains 45 variables for 73 countries. Thirteen of the variables are responses to World Values Survey questions, aggregated by country; 25 others are indices constructed from World Values Survey responses; the rest are cross-sectional data from other sources such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and Freedom House. Different variables correspond to different years, but they are generally from the early 1990s. The variables include socioeconomic and demographic indicators, indicators of democracy, religious-secular values items, survival-vs.-self-expression items, support for democracy items, and others.

The dataset and the codebook can be downloaded from: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/human-development.html.

**Dataset Award**

This award is given annually for a publicly-available data set in the field of comparative politics. The interrelated goals of the award include a concern with encouraging development of high-quality data sets that contribute to the shared base of empirical knowledge in comparative politics; acknowledging the hard work that goes into preparing good data sets; recognizing data sets that have made important substantive contributions to the field of comparative politics; and calling attention to the contribution of scholars who make their data publicly available in a well-documented form.

Nominations for the award are due by April 15. Please submit nominations directly to the members of the 2007 award committee: Kaare Strom, Chair (kstrom@ucsd.edu); Johanna Kristin Birnir (jkbirnir@gmail.com); Kenneth Scheve (kenneth.scheve@yale.edu).

**Editors’ Notes**

The editors welcome suggestions of other relatively new and potentially useful datasets that should be announced or reviewed in *APSA-CP*. Anyone interested in reviewing a dataset for the newsletter should contact Michael Coppedge at coppedge.1@nd.edu.

We invite our readers to request hard copies of back issues (beginning with the winter 2003 newsletter issue) at the cost of $1.50 per issue. They should send their request(s) by email to kschuenk@nd.edu.
Seymour Martin Lipset, 1922-2006

Seymour Martin Lipset, leading theorist of democracy and of American exceptionalism, died on Dec. 31 in Arlington, Virginia at the age of 84. Mr. Lipset wrote on a large canvass that straddled political science and sociology. No postwar social scientist has more insightfully analyzed the conditions, values, and practice of democracy, both in the United States and comparatively throughout the world. He was driven, throughout his life, to understand the particular character of American politics and society, and his writings will be regarded as a definitive statement of American self-understanding in the second half of the twentieth century.

Mr. Lipset’s father, a printer, and his mother, a seamstress, came to New York from czarist Russia. Mr. Lipset grew up in the Bronx and went to the City College of New York before completing his Ph.D. at Columbia in 1948. His working-class Jewish roots and his education in the leftist political ferment of City College, New York, were reflected in his early Trotskyism and his lifelong quest to understand the particularities of American society. From the time of his Ph.D. dissertation and first published book, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan (1950), Mr. Lipset was driven to explain why the United States, alone among western democracies, never had a durable socialist or labour party. His last book, It Didn’t Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States, was an ambitious attempt to answer the same question by comparing widely across and within western democracies. In this book, which was published in 2001, six months before he suffered a disabling stroke, Mr. Lipset argued that the distinctive weakness of socialism in America reflected the heterogeneity of the working class and subsequent weakness of social class. One consequence was that the political influence of those at the bottom of the society was limited. This helps explain why America stands out among western democracies in terms of its high level of economic inequality and its weak welfare state.

Mr. Lipset is regarded as one of the first neoconservatives, to a large extent because he liked to stress the individualist streak in American culture – and this at a time when most social scientists eschewed cultural factors in their analyses. But his political views are not easily categorized. He was much more interested in explaining than in prescribing. He regarded the United States as a country that was exceptional in its lack of class structure, its individualistic and anti-statist culture, and consequent meritocracy and economic dynamism. He noted and explained why radicalism in America was more anarchist than socialist. He explained democratic stability, which he valued greatly, not in terms of consensus, but as the result of class conflict which took a moderate, rather than radical, form.

Few, if any, scholars of democracy have been more concerned than Lipset with various forms of conflict and competition. The notion of democratic class conflict is indelibly associated with his writings. In his classic book, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Lipset argued that democracy “requires institutions which support conflict and disagreement as well as those which sustain legitimacy and consensus”. His wide-ranging historical and comparative analyses of these conditions were models of clarity and incisiveness. They have influenced generations of students, including a Vice-Chancellor at a major British university who once explained to me that Political Man set him on the course of becoming a political scientist. Individual chapters in the book have spawned extensive literatures. Among the most influential are Mr. Lipset’s analysis of support for Nazism as middle-class radicalism, and his chapter linking democracy to economic development (originally published as an article in the American Political Science Review). Political Man has sold 400,000 copies and has been translated into 20 languages.

One of Mr. Lipset’s enduring contributions to our understanding of democratic stability is the notion that cross-cutting cleavages reduce the intensity of political emotions and assure individuals in the minority on one issue that they may form the majority on other issues. His analysis of the dynamics of legitimacy and the effects of cleavage structure are among the most compelling in political sociology. These and related issues of democratic development are advanced in The First New Nation (1973), which highlights the importance of political leadership and political values, and the determinants and consequences of party systems.

Virtually all of Mr. Lipset’s writings on democracy are comparative. Both The First New Nation and Continental Divide (1990) are motivated by the conviction that an understanding of American politics and society is best served by comparing the United States to countries that it is most similar to, i.e. English speaking developed countries, and particularly Canada. Mr. Lipset’s classic analyses of the economic conditions of democracy (in Political Man) and the development of party systems (written with Stein Rokkan and republished in Consensus and Conflict (1973)) are wide ranging cross-national comparisons. In staking out new areas of inquiry and guiding subsequent
research, Lipset’s writings demonstrate the power of comparison in the study of society.

The social egalitarianism he described in American society permeated Mr. Lipset’s own life. To his colleagues and students, including undergraduates, he was known simply as Marty. Mr. Lipset was indifferent to fine wine or expensive meals. On entering a restaurant he wanted, above all, to be served quickly, and was once heard quacking to alert a waiter to bring his order of duck. In the days when he smoked a pipe, his penchant for setting fire to his wastebasket was regarded by his secretaries as an inescapable occupational hazard. Mr. Lipset had little in the way of refined manners, but he was respected – and loved – by a wide circle of friends and colleagues on account of his affectionate directness, his restless intellectual curiosity, and his utter lack of guile in personal relations.

After completing his Ph.D at Columbia University in 1948, Mr. Lipset taught at UC Berkeley, Columbia University, Harvard University, the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and George Mason University. Lipset held numerous professional offices, serving as president of the World Association for Public Opinion Research, the International Society of Political Psychology, and the National Academy of Arts and Sciences. Lipset was the only person to serve as President of both the American Sociological Association and the American Political Science Association. No living political scientist or sociologist was more frequently cited by other social scientists in the closing two decades of the twentieth century.

Mr. Lipset is survived by his wife, Sydnee, three children, David, Daniel, and Carola, from his first marriage with the former Elsie Braun who died in 1987, and six grandchildren.

This piece appeared in The Guardian on Friday January 12, 2007, and is reprinted here with permission from the author, Gary Marks.

APSA Comparative Politics Section, 2006-7 Nominations and Awards Committees

Nominations committee

The committee will nominate at-large members of the Executive Committee and the future Vice-President/President Elect of the Section for 2007-2009. Its work will begin after the 2007 APSA meetings.

Committee membership:
Jennifer Widner, Princeton University (jwidner@Princeton.edu), chair
John Huber, Columbia (Jdh39@columbia.edu)
Stathis Kalyvas, Yale University (stathis.kalyvas@yale.edu)
Lisa Wedeen, U of Chicago (l-wdeen@uchicago.edu)
Kurt Weyland, U of Texas (kweyland@mail.utexas.edu)

Luebbert book award

The committee will award the Gregory Luebbert award for the best book published in comparative politics in 2005-6. It will make its decision in time for the deadline of June 1, 2007.

Committee membership:
Karen Alter, Northwestern, Chair (kalter@northwestern.edu), chair
Johanna Birnir, U of Buffalo (jbirnir@buffalo.edu)
Kenneth Scheve, Yale University (kenneth.scheve@yale.edu)

Sage Best APSA Paper Award

The award, supported by Sage Publications, is for the best APSA paper presented at the 2006 APSA meetings. The committee will make its decision in time for the deadline of June 1, 2007.

Committee membership:
Chris Anderson, Cornell (cba22@cornell.edu), chair
Yoshiko Herrera, Harvard (Herrera@fas.harvard.edu)
David S. Brown, Colorado (david.s.brown@colorado.edu)

Dataset Award

The award recognizes development of high-quality data sets that contribute to the shared base of empirical knowledge in comparative politics and calls attention to the contribution of scholars who make their data publicly available in a well-documented form. The committee’s decision will be made in time for its deadline of June 1, 2007.

Committee membership:
Kaare Strom, U. of California at San Diego (kstrom@ucsd.edu), chair
Johanna Birnir, U of Buffalo (jbirnir@buffalo.edu)

Luebbert Article award

The committee will award the Gregory Luebbert award for the best article published in comparative politics in the last year. It will make its decision in time for the deadline of June 1, 2007.

Committee membership:
Robert Rohrschneider, Indiana University, chair (rrorsch@indiana.edu), chair
Margaret Keck, Johns Hopkins (margaretkeck@mac.com)
Devra Moehler, Cornell (dcm37@cornell.edu)

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Letter from the President

Comparative Politics and Sociology: Love Lost and Regained, Sidney Tarrow

Symposium: Academic Freedom and the War on Terror

How the War on Terror Affects Me as a Political Scientist, Larry Diamond
Comparative Politics of the Middle East and Academic Freedom, Ellen Lust-Okar, Lisa Anderson, Steven Heydemann, and Mark Tessler
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The War on Terror within Academe: Smear Campaigns and the New Political Correctness

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Dissertation Support from the National Science Foundation, Brian D. Humes and Paul J. Wahlbeck

Datasets

Improving Data Quality: What Is To Be Done?
Yoshiko M. Herrera and Devesh Kapur with Sogomon Tarontsi
Other datasets

News & Notes

Announcements

Changes of address for the Newsletter take place automatically when members change their address with the APSA. Please do not send change-of-address information to the Newsletter.